

CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE
ON DISARMAMENT

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FINAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE ONE HUNDRED AND SEVENTY-SIXTH MEETING

THE UNIVERSITY
OF MICHIGAN

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COLLECTION

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Thursday, 19 March 1964, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman:

Ato A. AGEDE

(Ethiopia)

PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Brazil:

Mr. E. HOSANNAH

Bulgaria:

Mr. K. LUKANOV

Mr. G. GHELEV

Mr. D. TEKHOV

Mr. G. YANKOV

Burma:

Mr. James BARRINGTON

U HTOON SHEIN

Canada:

Mr. R.M. TAIT

Mr. J.F.M. BELL

Mr. P.D. LEE

Czechoslovakia:

Mr. M. ZEMLA

Mr. T. LAHODA

Mr. J. BUCEK

Mr. V. VAJNAR

Ethiopia:

Ato A. AGEDE

Ato S. TEFERRA

India:

Mr. V.C. TRIVEDI

Mr. A.S. MEHTA

Mr. K. KRISHNA RAO

Mr. G.R. SAPRA

Italy:

Mr. F. CAVALLETTI

Mr. E. GUIDOTTI

Mr. S. AVETTA

Mr. G.P. TOZZOLI

PRESENT AT THE TABLE (Cont'd)

Mexico:

Mr. Ernesto de SANTIAGO

Miss E. AGUIRRE

Mr. Manuel FELLO

Nigeria:

Mr. L.C.N. OBI

Poland:

Mr. M. LOBODYCZ

Mr. E. STANIEWSKI

Mr. J. GOLDBLAT

Mrs. E. ADAMOWSKA

Romania:

Mr. V. DUMITRESCU

Mr. E. GLASER

Mr. C. UNGUREANU

Mr. M. IONESCU

Sweden:

Mr. P. LIND

Mr. P. HAMMARSKJOLD

Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics:

Mr. S.K. TSARAPKIN

Mr. I.G. USACHEV

Mr. V.V. SHUSTOV

United Arab Republic:

Mr. A. FATTAH HASSAN

Mr. A. OSMAN

Mr. M. KASSEM

Mr. S.E. IBRAHIM

United Kingdom:

Sir Paul MASON

Mr. J.G. TAHOURLIN

Mr. A.J. WILLIAMS

PRESENT AT THE TABLE (Cont'd)

United States of America:

Mr. A.S. FISHER
Mr. A.L. RICHARDS
Mr. S. MacDONALD
Mr. R.A. MARTIN

Special Representative of the
Secretary-General:

Mr. D. PROTITCH

Deputy Special Representative
of the Secretary-General:

Mr. W. EPSTEIN

The CHAIRMAN (Ethiopia): I declare open the 176th meeting of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament.

Mr. FISHER (United States of America): In our search for measures of common interest the United States has presented to this Conference a series of proposals (ENDC/120) which would in the first instance prevent the acceleration or extension of the arms race and would result eventually in a reversal of its course. Proposals such as those for a freeze of offensive and defensive strategic nuclear vehicles, and for a cut-off of the production of fissionable materials for use in nuclear weapons, embody this approach.

Today I should like to present to the Committee a proposal for the physical destruction of armaments. The arms we propose to destroy are of real significance. They are bomber aircraft which can carry weapons of immense destructive capability. Agreement on and implementation of this measure would present a graphic example of armament reduction to the entire world.

The United States proposes destruction by the United States and the Soviet Union of an equal number of B-47 and TU-16 bombers. We propose that this destruction be carried out at the rate of twenty per month on each side, the bombers to be taken from the operational inventory. We are prepared to continue destruction of these bombers at this rate for a period of two years. In addition, we are prepared to increase the total number destroyed by adding to the monthly quota an additional agreed number to be taken from bombers stored and preserved for emergency mobilization.

We are prepared to negotiate the manner in which this destruction will be verified. The verification should be relatively simple. It should include no more than the observation of the destruction of the monthly quota of agreed bombers from each country at designated depots.

The B-47 bomber which we are ready to destroy as our part of this agreement is a truly formidable weapon. The B-47 is a six-engine jet bomber which can fly over 4,000 miles without refuelling. With in-flight refuelling, it is an intercontinental bomber. It can carry a multi-megaton bomb load. We can gather some measure of the danger of our times by noting that the explosive yield from the bomb load of one B-47 is greater than that from all bombs dropped by all bombers in the Second World War.

As long as such bombers remain in existence in the hands of the nuclear Powers -- whether actually flying or stored so that they can easily be rendered flyable -- they remain a substantial factor of military power. In the hands of non-nuclear Powers -- and used without nuclear weapons -- these planes are no less a factor of military power. The B-47 is superior in many respects to any other bomber outside the forces of the United States and the Soviet Union. The representative of the Soviet Union, Mr. Tsarapkin, summed it up last Thursday when he said that bomber aircraft "still remain one of the powerful means of carrying on a war of aggression..." (ENDC/PV.174, p.53, and ENDC/123, p.5).

The United States and the Soviet Union are the possessors of the world's greatest military arsenals. That is particularly true with regard to nuclear delivery vehicles.

The B-47 and TU-16 bombers are logical armaments with which to start the process of physical destruction of arms. The United States and the Soviet Union possess roughly comparable numbers of those aircraft. The two types of aircraft have been assigned generally similar strategic roles. Thus the balance in the over-all force structure of the two sides would be maintained at the reduced levels resulting from their destruction. This, of course, is in keeping with the fifth principle in the Joint Statement of Agreed Principles (ENDC/5): that measures of this kind should be balanced so that no State or group of States should gain a military advantage and that security should be ensured equally for all.

The verification required would be simple. It would not involve areas of great sensitivity.

Some may argue that the destruction of B-47 and TU-16 bombers makes no real difference because the United States plans to phase-out the B-47. The United States does have plans to phase B-47s out of its battle-ready forces. I assume the Soviet Union also has phase-out plans for the TU-16. But the phasing-out of aircraft does not mean destruction. Bombers in storage can be flying again in short order.

What the United States is now proposing is to negotiate a rate of destruction which, if immediately implemented, would be significantly faster than its planned phase-out rate. Moreover, phase-out plans are subject to reconsideration in the light of changing international circumstances. That has happened in the past; it could happen again. The United States is now proposing the actual physical destruction of

(Mr. Fisher, United States)

an equal number of bombers on each side. Once actual physical destruction has been accomplished, the aircraft can no longer be returned to operational status.

I have already explained that the B-47 bomber is a truly formidable weapon. It makes a great deal of difference whether these bombers and the TU-16s are physically destroyed, as the United States proposes, or are retained in active forces, preserved for emergency mobilization, or transferred to third countries.

The United States in the proposal which we are discussing today, and the Soviet Union in its proposal of 28 January (ENDC/123), have both dealt with the destruction of bomber aircraft. We should therefore be able to follow the directions given us by the eighth principle of the Joint Statement of Agreed Principles and work out the widest possible area of agreement between us at the earliest possible date.

From the position which the Soviet Union has thus far put forward at this Conference we are not yet able to determine the extent and nature of the destruction of bombers it envisages; but that should be no obstacle to agreement on the United States proposal. Agreement on our proposal can be reached now without involving us in the highly difficult issues raised by an all-encompassing plan.

An agreement for the destruction of all bomber aircraft would raise a series of complex questions. For example, there is the question of the participating nations, not all of which might be able to agree to eliminate their bombers in the absence of alternative means of protecting themselves. Again, there is the matter of coverage: what would constitute a bomber for the purposes of such an agreement? There are many types of aircraft, both civil and military, which might be capable of carrying bombs although we should not consider them as bombers and could not reasonably be expected to agree to their destruction. Perhaps the most serious question is the imbalance which would result from such a proposal. There are great differences among nations in the size, mission and strategic role of the bomber fleet of each, and consequently great differences in the effects which the elimination of all bombers would have on national security.

The proposal of the United States makes it possible to get on promptly with the objective of the Soviet proposal -- the physical destruction of bombers -- without having to deal with those vexatious problems. The aircraft we propose to

destroy would be included within any possible interpretation of the Soviet plan. Therefore the nations have everything to gain and nothing to lose by agreeing promptly to our proposal and by promptly putting the agreement into effect.

The proposal to destroy an equal number of B-47s and TU-16s, if acted upon, could be of real significance to this Conference:

First, it would provide a tangible reduction in one important category of the world's inventory of weapons. The advantages of that can be seen in relation to such broad measures as a freeze of strategic nuclear vehicles, where a reduction in bombers would mean freezing at an even lower level than would otherwise be possible.

Second, it would ensure that the bombers destroyed could not be transferred to the armament inventories of other nations. That would impose an important restraint on the proliferation of highly-sophisticated weapon systems. It would ensure that the resources of other nations should not be diverted from the task of national development to maintaining and operating these costly weapons.

To summarize briefly what I have said, we propose that the United States and the Soviet Union agree to destroy an equal number of B-47 and TU-16 bombers on a one-for-one basis, at an agreed rate, with simple verification.

This proposal is only a step towards solving the problem of disarmament; but by taking it we can begin to reduce the destructive capability present in the world and lessen the dangers of its proliferation. We can take one more step towards reducing the nuclear threat which hangs over all mankind.

For those reasons we should surely carry on with this proposal, and do so right away.

Mr. LOBODYCZ (Poland): As far as military budgets are concerned, we explained our position at the last two Thursday meetings (ENDC/PV.172, pp.6 et seq., PV.174, pp.20 et seq.). We have also listened with care to a series of thought-provoking statements on the subject. The attention of those who spoke was focused on a verified reduction of military expenditures as a measure for early implementation, rather than on an analysis of budgets as a means for controlling disarmament measures. In that connexion may I refer to the statement made last week by the representative of Sweden? (ENDC/PV.174, pp.5 et seq.) With all due respect I must say that

the proposition with which he was dealing, although concerning military budgets, was unrelated to the proposal submitted to this Committee for a reduction of military expenditures (ENDC/123). We think that a discussion of the issue which he raised could be conceivable within the framework of general and complete disarmament, subject, of course, to an agreement on a concrete programme of disarmament measures.

After that brief digression, permit me to point out that the problem of the prevention of a wider spreading of nuclear weapons has been another focal point in our deliberations. The main concern of all those who have spoken on the subject has been, if I assess their views correctly, to create by relatively simple means a propitious climate and favourable conditions for disarmament.

The "n-th country" problem has already become a permanent part of the vocabulary of discussions on disarmament. This rather enigmatic term refers to the indeterminate number of countries which may in future unlock Pandora's box of atomic plenty. I am sure we are all agreed that the present situation, in which enormous stockpiles of nuclear weapons not only exist but even continue to grow, is bad enough and makes our search for the reduction of armed forces and armaments sufficiently complicated. We may safely assume that an arithmetical increase in the number of countries possessing nuclear weapons could bring about an increase of those complications in geometrical progression. That is why the prevention of a wider diffusion of nuclear weapons is one of those measures which -- if I may use the words of the representative of India, Mr. Trivedi -- are

"... calculated to prevent developments -- unhealthy developments -- which would make our ultimate task much more difficult if not impossible."

(ENDC/PV.174, p.12)

Briefly, what we mean is that we must prevent the situation from becoming worse. We could achieve that at least by arresting the tendency towards dragging additional States into the nuclear arms race; thus we could create proper conditions for the elimination of weapons of mass destruction still in the possession of a limited number of Powers. Some experts have coined a new and rather peculiar term, "pax atomica", to define the present relationship of forces in the world. However, if the number of States controlling nuclear weapons is increased, even this rather shaky atomic peace could be upset. Each new State entering the "atomic club" could increase the so-called coefficient of uncertainty. To those who want to build peace

on uncertainty we should like to point out that it is our deep conviction that such an approach undoubtedly could guarantee security to no one — neither to the nuclear nor to the non-nuclear Powers.

Awareness of the danger of a wider dispersion of nuclear weapons to the fate of disarmament — and, for that matter, to the fate of our globe — was inherent in a number of proposals formulated during the past few years both within and outside the United Nations. The approaches to this question have differed. Different also have been the methods suggested by the authors of the proposals. The main idea, however, has remained unaltered: to stop the proliferation of nuclear weapons. In some of the proposals the nuclear weapon as such has constituted a point of departure. In others, certain aspects of its production and improvement have been involved. Some suggestions have referred to the closing of the "nuclear club". Others have related to the creation of a "non-nuclear club". Still others have provided for obligations to be undertaken by both nuclear and non-nuclear States, as recommended by the United Nations in the so-called Irish resolution (A/RES/1665(XVI)). The problem of the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes only has also been raised.

May I, in addition, draw the attention of the Committee to proposals which, on the one hand, provide for more far-reaching steps from the point of view of the subject of the agreement, but which on the other hand are territorially restricted? I have in mind the concept of establishing nuclear-free zones in different geographical regions. That concept, as is well known, was first formulated by the Government of Poland (ENDC/C.1/1) and still enjoys wide popularity.

The Moscow Treaty on the partial cessation of nuclear weapon tests (ENDC/10C/Rev.1) was, of course, the first agreement relating to the subject now under discussion.

I should like to avail myself of this opportunity to mention the last Polish proposal put forward by Mr. Gomulka for freezing nuclear and thermonuclear armaments in central Europe. That proposal, elaborated in the memorandum of the Government of the Polish People's Republic, was submitted recently to the Governments concerned. The Polish Government expressed at the same time its readiness to enter, through appropriate channels, into discussions and negotiations with the interested parties in order to reach an agreement on the implementation of this objective. We do not

think that those countries which are genuinely interested in easing international tension, in the improvement of the international situation, and particularly in directing the course of events in central Europe towards disarmament, détente and mutual security could adopt towards our proposal a non-constructive attitude.

The basic motive of all the proposals for the prevention of the wider spreading of nuclear weapons was to prevent new States from acquiring a so-called nuclear status. That objective should be followed with consistency, for the choice is only between a nuclear and a non-nuclear status. A mixture of a nuclear status with a non-nuclear status, so as to set up a hybrid State with a semi-nuclear status, could only worsen the situation, and in any event would have nothing in common with the postulate of preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons. We do not think that a non-nuclear status should be considered discriminatory; for, as the Minister for Foreign Affairs for Ireland, Mr. Aiken, so pertinently stated at the eighteenth session of the United Nations General Assembly:

"... it would be absurd if acceptance of the status of a non-nuclear State were to be regarded as implying any degree of national sacrifice or loss of prestige. Surely, on the contrary..." (A/PV.1226, provisional, p.8-10).

If we succeeded in halting the nuclear arms race, it would be beneficial to everybody, to every State. Hence non-nuclear States should, in their own interests and exercising their sovereign rights, voluntarily renounce nuclear weapons; and the nuclear Powers should, also of their own volition and bearing in mind their special responsibilities, refrain from transferring nuclear weapons to others. We therefore agree with Mr. Trivedi that we should take up seriously and realistically the question of formulating an agreement on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons (ENDC/PV.174, p.16).

It goes without saying that such an agreement should bar once and for all, all ways, both direct and indirect, towards the acquisition of nuclear weapons by those States which do not now possess them. Such an agreement not only must imply the renunciation of transfer of nuclear weapons or the expansion of the area of their location, but also must mean avoiding any political steps which could lead to an increase in the number of those controlling nuclear weapons.

May I recall here that this is also the idea behind the Irish resolution, upon which the Western Powers themselves proposed to build an agreement on the non-

dissemination of nuclear weapons? Mr. Aiken gave an authentic interpretation of the essence of the resolution by stressing that non-nuclear Powers should be prevented from manufacturing or otherwise acquiring control of such weapons by ownership or by any other means.

The establishment of the so-called NATO multilateral nuclear force runs counter to that basic requirement and therefore stands in the way of reaching an agreement on the non-dispersion of nuclear weapons. How could one reconcile an agreement on the preservation of the status quo in the field of nuclear armaments with a plan providing for co-ownership and a share in controlling nuclear weapons? Is it possible to have one face to God and another to the Devil? Co-ownership -- and that is the essence of the multilateral force -- is but one of the forms of ownership. Co-ownership obviously implies co-decision in the use of nuclear weapons; and from that there remains only one step to fully-fledged ownership of those weapons and an unrestricted right to decide on their use. Such a course of events is dangerous in itself. It is doubly dangerous if it invites to the nuclear game those political and military forces in Europe which have been advancing territorial claims and proclaiming a programme aimed at changing the political situation in Europe brought about as a result of the Second World War.

Once again we cannot but agree with Mr. Trivedi that, if it is not healthy that there should be nuclear weapons in the world, it would be suicidal if more countries possessed them. (ibid.)

The proponents of the NATO nuclear force put before us an artificial alternative: either a multilateral force with West German participation, or an independent national nuclear force of the German Federal Republic. I venture to call it "artificial", for in both cases the non-nuclear State would acquire a nuclear status. In this context let me reiterate a question asked by the head of the Polish delegation at the eighteenth session of the United Nations General Assembly:

"What purpose is being served here? Is the international situation of today any worse than it was at the time when the German Federal Republic agreed to limit its armaments?" (A/C.1/PV.1322, provisional, p.33-35)

More and more sober-minded people in the West admit that the multilateral force as envisaged by the NATO planners is entirely irrelevant to the security of the West. Western military experts indicate the dangers which might arise as a result of misunderstood orders or even outright provocation. Apart from that, the establishment

(Mr. Lobodycz, Poland)

of new forms of nuclear ownership would blur the prospects for nuclear disarmament, for any agreement in this field could be effectively blocked by any of the co-owners of nuclear weapons. Last but not least, irrespective of the views which some Western Governments may hold with regard to the role of the multilateral nuclear force, the whole undertaking would be incompatible with the spirit of the Moscow Treaty and would cause new international tensions, thus upsetting the climate brought about by that Treaty.

Is it not paradoxical and bitterly ironical that the concept of a multilateral nuclear force was conceived and is being pushed forward precisely when world public opinion is so acutely aware of the danger of a nuclear conflict, intended or unintended; when more and more countries in different regions are expressing their readiness to renounce nuclear arms and are categorically demanding that the arms race be stopped and general and complete disarmament carried out; when the relaxation of international tension and the restoration of confidence among nations are an imperative of our times?

There is an urgent necessity for constructive steps to avert an increase in the number of those who control nuclear weapons. We can accelerate the achievement of this goal only through measures with a clearly-defined objective, without making exceptions contradicting that objective.

We hope that the Western delegations will give careful consideration to the arguments we have just advanced, and will draw conclusions which might help us to move forward.

Mr. OBI (Nigeria): I should like to extend a most hearty, even if belated, welcome to the new leaders of the Indian, Polish and United States delegations. The contributions they have already made are an indication of the very valuable role they intend to play in helping to move forward the work of the Committee.

My delegation wishes to make a brief statement on some of the proposals now before the Committee. If we address ourselves once more to the subject of collateral measures and not to our main task of general and complete disarmament, to which we continue to attach the utmost importance and with which we shall deal in the not too distant future; if we stubbornly continue to direct the attention of the

Committee to the so-called collateral measures; we do so not only because any agreements arrived at in that field would have favourable repercussions on our work, but also because there is a sense of urgency involved in finding a solution to some of them.

One such problem to be solved quickly is that relating to measures for the prevention of the further proliferation of nuclear weapons. As my delegation declared on 24 January 1964:

"An agreement to prevent the further proliferation of nuclear weapons is an ever-obvious necessity, and every moment of delay increases both the difficulty of reaching such an agreement and the danger that more countries will acquire control of those weapons. As it is, we have great difficulty in dealing with the present nuclear monster. The hydra-headed monster which would result if a non-dissemination agreement were not reached would daunt us more if not overpower us, and we have no Spenserian magic weapons to aid us in our fight." (ENDC/PV.159, p.15)

That point of view was obviously very well endorsed by the Soviet Government, which, in its memorandum submitted a few days after my statement, declared inter alia:

"A widening of the circle of States possessing nuclear weapons would increase many times over the danger of the outbreak of a thermonuclear war. At the same time a widening of the circle of nuclear States would also make it much more difficult to solve the problem of disarmament." (ENDC/123, p.4)

The statements made by representatives of the Western Powers, even at the highest level, including the late President Kennedy's statement of 26 June 1963 (ENDC/102) and the statement made recently in this Committee by the United Kingdom Foreign Secretary (ENDC/PV.169, pp.10,11), have expressed equal concern at and awareness of the dangers which would further menace humanity through the absence of an agreement to prevent the further dissemination of nuclear weapons. Indeed, as Mr. Foster declared:

"The spread of nuclear weapons and weapon technology to non-nuclear nations constitutes a grave threat to the security and peace of all nations, large and small, nuclear and non-nuclear. This is one of the postulates upon which all participants in this Conference agree." (ENDC/PV.164, p.5)

(Mr. Obi, Nigeria)

It is therefore a somewhat remarkable piece of irony that, in spite of the general consensus on the necessity and urgency of reaching agreement on this subject, we seem to be still far from our goal because of a few obstacles. We have noted the obstacles in the way to agreement and have listened with great attention to the views expressed by all sides on the subject, not excluding those on the proposed creation of a NATO multilateral nuclear force. My delegation has given considerable thought to this, and I must confess that we are not yet satisfied with the results of our deliberations. We are not clear in our minds about one or two things regarding the multilateral nuclear force. We do not know beyond any reasonable doubt that the creation of that force would per se contribute to or hasten the proliferation of nuclear weapons to other States. On the other hand, we do not know beyond reasonable doubt that it would not.

However, it does seem to us that in any case the creation of the multilateral nuclear force would certainly result in the proliferation of nuclear armaments -- whether necessarily to other States or not, as I have indicated already, is still unclear to us. We consider this increase neither necessary nor helpful to the over-all progress of the task with which the Committee is charged. My delegation, naturally, is never happy at any increase in the armaments of States; and for that reason, if for no other, we should be happier if things were not developing in that direction. Of course, we are not unaware of the political expediency which appears to dictate the creation of this force. Doubts regarding the creation of the multilateral nuclear force, or any other doubts, should not in our view stand in the way of a consideration of this collateral measure. It may well be that after a thorough discussion and the necessary explanation our doubts will be removed; at least we hope so.

In addition, an effective agreement on non-dissemination of nuclear weapons could well limit, if not determine, the very nature of some of the present obstacles to agreement. We are convinced that a discussion of that measure is necessary; and we should therefore welcome serious discussions on it either in this forum or at informal meetings -- or both. Such a discussion would no doubt help to minimize differences over the obstacles to agreement, while clearing our own minds on the matter.

(Mr. Obi, Nigeria)

I repeat, an agreement on the non-dissemination of nuclear weapons is an urgent necessity. However, faith without works is dead, the Catechism tells us, and an agreement on non-dissemination of nuclear weapons is by no means the millennium. In fact, it would be likened to a child born during a famine. If the famine continues unabated, the child is likely to die of inanition resulting from lack of sustenance. Indeed, the life of an agreement on non-dissemination of nuclear weapons would be dependent, among other things, on a few factors such as the following: (1) that the armaments race should not continue unchecked, that its pace should be reduced, and that it should be halted if possible; (2) that serious efforts should be made towards nuclear containment; and (3) that physical destruction of some armaments, including missiles, should be undertaken.

Of course we recognize that, without an agreement on general and complete disarmament, some serious nuclear aspirants might not be unduly inhibited. Other potential nuclear Powers, however, could be induced to give the matter second thought if some progress in other fields were made and, in particular, if the super-Powers were to show proof of their sincerity, good will and seriousness of purpose by taking radical measures along the aforementioned lines.

We are therefore very much interested in the proposals recently submitted by the United States (ENDC/120) and the Soviet Union (ENDC/123). In particular we welcome the various measures proposed by the United States for a nuclear containment, and the proposals in the Soviet memorandum relating to the elimination of all bomber aircraft and a 10 to 15 per cent cut in military expenditures. We have already welcomed the decision of the United States to shut down four of its plutonium piles and to cut down its production of fissionable materials by 25 per cent (ENDC/PV.166, p.19). We feel that that is a good step which is worthy of emulation.

We also think that the United States offer for a cut-off of fissionable materials and a transfer of a significant quantity to peaceful uses should receive the serious attention of the Committee. It may well be that the nuclear Powers have already produced more than they require for military purposes. This, however, we feel, need not reduce the significance and value of the United States proposal. During the last session of the General Assembly the Nigerian delegation expressed its deep satisfaction at the United States offer to transfer 60,000 kilograms of fissionable material if the Soviet Union transferred 40,000 kilograms (ENDC/PV.151, p.12).

(Mr. Obi, Nigeria)

As Mr. Foster pointed out on 13 February, the amount involved in terms of money is somewhat substantial (ENDC/PV.166, p.18). Of course, in comparison with the vast sums still appropriated for military purposes it is a mere trickle. We feel that this offer in itself has certain interesting angles and possibilities, and we sincerely trust that the Soviet delegation will give it the serious consideration which, in our view, it deserves. This should be a promising area, and we should explore it for all it is worth. Therefore we look forward to a business-like discussion of these United States proposals relating to a cessation of the production of fissionable materials and the transfer to peaceful uses of a significant quantity of such materials.

We have received with considerable satisfaction the proposal of the Soviet Union for the elimination of bomber aircraft. We have already had cause to regret the absence of any agreement which would result in any destruction of armaments, and we think this Soviet proposal is an important move, especially as it is not confined to obsolete armaments alone. We see merit, of course, even in the destruction of obsolete and obsolescent armaments, if for no other reason than to prevent an unnecessary proliferation of such bombers and armaments; but the Soviet proposal is of great significance, as it goes well beyond that. We sincerely trust that either in this Committee or in the meetings of the co-Chairmen this proposal will receive due priority. There may be difficulties in reaching an agreement on the destruction of all bomber aircraft, but let us explore it seriously.

We have listened with great interest to the important statement made this morning by the representative of the United States. That is a very important proposal, and we shall give it close study. I trust it will receive the serious attention of the Committee. However, we hope it will be enlarged to include other bombers besides the category described by the United States representative. For our part we should be happy if, in addition to the destruction of all or some bomber aircraft, a few delivery vehicles and missiles were included as well. That would make a better bonfire and would provide a decent burial for categories of armaments that the super-Powers now consider as having more or less outlived their usefulness. The psychological effect on the world of such an agreement and its implementation would, I believe, be better imagined than described.

(Mr. Obi, Nigeria)

My delegation has received with some interest the United States proposal for a verified freeze of the characteristics and numbers of strategic vehicles. We have given that proposal the most careful study, and yet we find ourselves in a sort of dilemma. On the one hand, we should like to see such an agreement materialize. After all, the best way of beginning the disarmament process -- and I believe that is the aim and wish of everyone here -- is to stop the arms race; and in what area would that be better done than in the most sensitive and significant one, that of the further development of more deadly weapons and missiles? On the other hand, however, we are not unaware of considerable difficulties, such as verification -- I hope these difficulties are not insurmountable -- arising from this proposal. There is also, I believe, the consideration of balance; for I am sure nobody would like a more dangerous situation to result from the implementation of this or indeed any agreement. We do, however, think that this proposal should be given close study by the Committee, and we need not be discouraged by difficulties. It is an interesting proposal, and I think we should at least discuss it seriously.

Now I will come to a subject on which I dwelt at some length at our meeting of 24 January (ENDC/PV.159, p.13); I refer, of course, to a reduction in the military expenditures of States, and in the first place those of the great Powers. We should like to reiterate our support in general for the Soviet proposal for a cut in military expenditures by 10 to 15 per cent. We have listened with great interest to, and studied most carefully, the various views expressed in this Committee on the subject of cutting military budgets. However, we regret that we still remain unconvinced by the arguments adduced by those delegations that do not appear to favour, for the time being, a cut in military expenditures. As the Committee is aware, the Nigerian delegation has always been keenly interested in a freeze and reduction of military expenditures. It would be squint-eyed to regard our interest in this subject as motivated, either solely or partly, by self-interest -- that is, by the so-called aid to developing countries. It is true that the astronomical sums now, unfortunately, appropriated for military purposes by the major Powers and their allies are almost equal to the gross national product of almost all the developing countries put together. But it is equally true that even in some of the most developed countries themselves there are pockets of squalor and abject poverty which require instant relief and would most certainly benefit from the freezing and cutting of military expenditures.

(Mr. Obi, Nigeria)

We see in the proposal for a reduction in military expenditures a reasonably realistic and courageous approach to the problem of slowing down the arms race. In our view, a reduction in military expenditures would appear to be most appropriate at this stage of our work; for, while it would have a definite and considerable impact on the over-all armaments of States, it would still leave the Powers concerned the choice of deciding to which aspect of their military resources they should direct the axe. Thus, while a global reduction in military expenditures would be effected, a State could retain the type of armament "mix" it considers desirable; and the balance of power, which we consider essential, need not be disturbed. Indeed, a reduction of military expenditures could be likened to the gradual deflation of a balloon -- the general shape being retained while the size shrinks perceptibly. Of course the problem of ensuring that any agreed cut in military expenditure is honourably implemented still remains with us. I have already expressed the considered view of my delegation that that problem is not beyond human ingenuity and that a solution can and must be found.

There is a subject on the lists of both the United States and the Soviet Union on which not enough has been said so far during this session of our Conference -- one on which, however, agreement appears more possible perhaps than on most of the others. I refer, of course, to measures such as reducing the risk of war by surprise attack. In a world in which thermonuclear war hangs over humanity, no effort should be spared to minimize the threat of war. We have already noted in the past that there seems to be considerable common ground in the proposals submitted by the two sides. The main obstacle to agreement, it seems, is the fact that the measures proposed by the Soviet Union in this field are made contingent on a reduction of troops in the territories of the two German States. There is no doubt that, if a reduction of troops could be effected in this area of tension and military confrontation, it would be welcome.

However, my delegation sees intrinsic value in the mere establishment of observation posts and so forth, and we wonder whether the time has not come for the Soviet Union to seriously consider unwrapping the package. After all, as the saying goes, "Half a loaf is better than none". Although we can -- and often do -- question such an approach towards disarmament on specific proposals, we believe it is true in this connexion.

(Mr. Obi, Nigeria)

I have endeavoured as far as possible to share with the Committee the thinking of my delegation on some of the various subjects before us. My remarks are of a preliminary nature, pending further explanations by the two co-Chairmen and their allies of the proposals they have submitted. We will make further comments as appropriate.

Meanwhile I should like to stress the view of my delegation that it is necessary to discuss in detail some of the subjects now before the Committee, and especially those which appear to promise early agreement. We are willing to believe that all the subjects submitted by both sides were presented in all sincerity and seriousness of purpose, and that it would be churlish to reject them out of hand. At least let us discuss them seriously. Perhaps after further explanation doubts surrounding some of the proposals will be removed and agreement brought nearer.

It is because we should appreciate serious and orderly consideration of the formidable items on the two lists that we advocate an agenda for that purpose. However, we do not believe that failure to arrive at an agenda satisfactory to both sides is unduly harmful at this stage; nor do we feel that it calls for undue despondency at this stage, much as we may regret it. However, the situation would be really more serious if this state of affairs were prolonged more than is absolutely necessary. In such an eventuality one could not but feel that an attempt was being made to stall, and that is something we should deplore.

Mr. LUKANOV (Bulgaria) (translation from Russian): Our discussions during the last few days clearly show that most of the delegations represented in the Committee consider that the reduction of military budgets is an urgent matter which deserves study on a priority basis. Although the Eighteen-Nation Committee does not admittedly draw up its proposals and recommendations on the strength of a majority vote, it may be asked whether there is any good reason why we should not accept the majority view on this particular subject. I do not now propose to discuss the importance of the reduction of military budgets as a measure which would effectively arrest the further development of the arms race and demonstrate the clear will of States to begin disarmament. I think this has long been quite obvious to everyone. Enough has also been said about the nature of this measure, about the ease with which it can be carried out, because, among other reasons,

each State would be free to decide to which items in the military budgets the cut should be applied.

It has similarly been made clear that a treaty on an agreed reduction of military budgets would provide for the appropriate measures of control. When we hear it said in this Committee that funds for military expenditure can be concealed in a budget, we should like to ask how any government could contrive to conceal such expenditure if it were obliged to reduce its military budget by, say, 10 per cent. Strong opposition would undoubtedly be aroused if, for instance, reductions were made in the appropriations for education, public health, construction or the country's cultural and economic requirements in order to preserve intact the concealed appropriations for military purposes. In any case, such reductions could not remain a secret. But, quite apart from the impracticability of concealing 10-15 per cent of a military budget, a reduction could be very easily controlled and, in view of the existence of general agreement, control would clearly present no serious problems.

We know that some States have increased their military budgets during the current year, and that consideration of the proposal for reducing military budgets is somewhat embarrassing to certain delegations. But that is surely the last thing which should deter us from taking a decision, for we are concerned not merely with a useful but also with a long-term measure. The references made here to constitutional difficulties cannot be regarded as a valid argument against taking a decision, and still less against discussing the question of reducing military budgets. It is difficult to conceive of a parliament which would oppose a proposal for reducing military budgets, particularly if this reduction were not a unilateral measure but a prerequisite for the implementation of an international agreement covering all States and designed as a new and important step towards disarmament.

It is hardly likely that those referring to constitutional difficulties have in mind the need to amend certain constitutional provisions before agreement can be reached on a reduction of military budgets. Constitutional amendments are not required in this instance; but even if they were, there would be no harm in that; disarmament itself would probably call for some constitutional changes. As we know, the constitutions of many States contain provisions on national defence, the structure of the armed forces, the supreme command, military service, and the like. What would be the point of such articles in a constitution once general and complete disarmament was achieved? Clearly, appropriate amendments would have to be made.

(Mr. Lukanov, Bulgaria)

In our view, therefore, there is no justification for the refusal of certain delegations to consider the proposal for a reduction of military budgets with a view to reaching agreement on a draft international treaty on the subject. We find it particularly difficult to understand the unwillingness of such delegations to agree to the Eighteen-Nation Committee addressing an appeal in some form or another to all governments to follow the example of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America in reducing their military budgets.

We see no need for additional explanations or further technical information on a matter of this kind. Still less do we see any danger of disturbing the balance of forces. One cannot but agree with the representative of Nigeria, who said at one of our meetings that the priority given to each of the problems submitted for our consideration should be determined by reference to the desirability of its solution. If there is one thing which is beyond dispute, it is that a reduction of military budgets is more than desirable.

I shall deal briefly with another problem the solution to which neither does nor can present any obstacles of a "technical" or other nature, but which is nevertheless of great importance. I refer to the establishment of denuclearized zones, a matter of particular interest to my country. No one can now deny that the idea of establishing denuclearized zones in various parts of the world has recently won general support. Nor can anyone now deny that the establishment of denuclearized zones is one of the so-called "collateral" measures the implementation of which would greatly improve the political atmosphere in the world and, above all, would most effectively help to prevent the dissemination of nuclear weapons, thus substantially reducing the threat of a nuclear war.

As we know, nearly all African States are in favour of proclaiming the African continent a denuclearized zone. The Presidents of five Latin-American countries have urged that Latin America should be declared a denuclearized zone (ENDC/87). Three of the four countries concerned -- the German Democratic Republic, Poland and Czechoslovakia -- have spoken in favour of establishing a denuclearized zone in Central Europe. Mr. Kekkonen, the President of Finland, has declared himself in favour of a denuclearized zone in northern Europe. Most Balkan States wish to see the Balkans and the Adriatic area proclaimed a denuclearized zone.

(Mr. Lukanov, Bulgaria)

Both at sessions of the United Nations General Assembly and in this Committee we have had occasion to put forward the opinion of the Government of the People's Republic of Bulgaria on the problem of denuclearized zones in general and, in particular, on the proposal for the establishment in the Balkans of a zone within which the stockpiling or acquiring of nuclear weapons by the nuclear Powers would not be permitted. In turn, the Balkan States would undertake not to acquire any nuclear weapons or to consent to the stationing of the nuclear weapons of other Powers on their territories. Naturally, the assumption of an undertaking by the nuclear Powers to respect the denuclearized status of this zone would be an essential and material feature of any agreement that might be concluded among the Balkan Powers. In addition, a clear expression by all the nuclear Powers of their willingness to respect this status would certainly facilitate and hasten a solution to this problem.

No one could possibly raise serious objections to this measure. It is, for instance, indisputable that the limitation of the area of dissemination and possible use of nuclear weapons is a measure which would help to strengthen world peace. It is indisputable that the smaller the territorial distribution of weapons of mass annihilation, the smaller the likelihood of a sudden attack or of the outbreak of nuclear war through miscalculation, chance or mechanical malfunctioning.

Both World Wars began in Europe -- the first in the Balkans and the second in Central Europe. The most powerful military alliances in the world are at present in immediate contact in those two regions, and this in an era of nuclear weapons. Consequently it is easy to understand how greatly confidence among States would be restored and world peace strengthened if the Eighteen-Nation Committee were to concentrate on these two regions in order to recommend agreed measures for diminishing the danger of a third World War.

Only one central European Power opposes the establishment of a denuclearized zone in this region -- the Federal Republic of Germany. It should be noted in this connexion that the other German Power -- the German Democratic Republic -- not only supports all peaceful proposals, including the proposal for a denuclearized zone in Central Europe, but itself proposes that both German States should undertake not to produce or acquire nuclear weapons, or to allow the nuclear weapons of other States to be stationed on their territories (ENDC/124).

(Mr. Lukanov, Bulgaria)

As we see it, the right course would be for our Committee to define its attitude to these problems. A clearly-expressed opinion or, better still, agreement on the establishment of a denuclearized zone in Central Europe would not merely be a major step towards peace and disarmament, but would also be of invaluable assistance in frustrating the designs of German revanchism and militarism, which are again becoming the main obstacles to the consolidation of peace in Europe and to progress in disarmament.

With regard to the establishment of a denuclearized zone in the Balkans, I should again like to emphasize that if the Western nuclear Powers were to announce their willingness to respect the denuclearized status of the Balkan region, as the Soviet Union has already done, this would considerably hasten and facilitate a positive solution. Thus in the regions where the First and Second World Wars broke out it would be possible to forestall a third World War, which would be a world-wide nuclear war.

Before I conclude I should like to say a few words about the proposal for the conclusion of a non-aggression pact between the NATO and the Warsaw Treaty countries (ENDC/77). If there exists any proposal for a collateral measure which does not raise problems of control, inspection or preservation of the present balance of forces, and which is uniformly feasible at all stages of disarmament and does not necessitate any technical studies, it is unquestionably the proposal for a non-aggression pact. A particularly favourable reception of this proposal is to be expected from those who, while regarding general and complete disarmament as a difficult and protracted task, are genuinely seeking means of improving the international situation. We have, however, so far heard no arguments from the delegations of the NATO countries except for the contention that the Eighteen-Nation Committee is not a suitable forum for discussion of this matter. We consider that attention should continue to be given to this collateral measure.

Our Western colleagues often emphasize that an "approximate military and strategic balance" has now been established in the world, and that this balance, which is essentially based on the "deterrent" effect of nuclear weapons, is an effective guarantee of world peace. On the strength of this view, the Western delegations frequently recommend that priority should be given to measures calculated to reduce the risk of accidental war. This view stems from mistaken and dangerous premises and I do not propose to discuss it at this stage. I must, however, again

(Mr. Lukanov, Bulgaria)

draw attention to the inconsistency of the position of the Western countries on this question. If the main danger to peace lies in the possibility of the outbreak of a thermonuclear war through error or chance -- in other words, if no one in the West intends deliberately to provoke a war -- why then do the Western States refuse to sign an international instrument committing themselves before the peoples of the whole world not to prepare for or begin a premeditated war?

It is easy to imagine the satisfaction and relief with which the world would receive the news that a non-aggression pact had been signed among the most powerful military-political alliances ever known in the history of the world, a pact whereby the States members of these alliances would undertake to settle all disputes, present and future, by means of negotiation.

As is clear, Mr. Chairman, the three collateral measures I have mentioned -- an agreement to reduce military budgets preceded by an appeal to all States to follow the example of the Soviet Union and the United States; the proposal for the establishment of denuclearized zones, particularly in Central Europe, the Balkans and the Adriatic, as part of the process of preventing the dissemination of nuclear weapons; the recommendation for the conclusion of a non-aggression pact between NATO and the Warsaw Treaty countries -- are three eminently practicable measures which would at the same time be extremely effective in reducing international tension and increasing mutual trust among States.

These three proposed collateral measures are not only fully practicable, but also involve little or no complicated inspection. They all have one and the same opponent -- the militarists of the Federal Republic of Germany. Indeed, the military budget of the Federal Republic of Germany is grossly inflated, and military circles at Bonn not only refuse to discuss its reduction but are also demanding a position of leadership in NATO commensurate with their "efforts". The West German State resolutely opposes the establishment of a denuclearized zone in Central Europe and the proposal of the Government of the German Democratic Republic for the renunciation of atomic arms by the two German States; it likewise opposes the conclusion of a non-aggression pact between the NATO and the Warsaw Treaty countries, although its powerful allies have promised to work for the conclusion of such a pact.

Thus the West German militarists are in effect using the NATO military alliance to block genuinely pacific and disinterested proposals designed solely to preserve peace. This dangerous state of affairs must be brought to an end. Acceptance of the

(Mr. Lukanov, Bulgaria)

three proposals I have mentioned would be helpful in this respect, too: it would check the warmongers and strengthen peaceful co-existence among all countries. That is all the more reason why the Eighteen-Nation Committee should devote close attention to these proposals and work for the speedy achievement of agreed decisions.

In this connexion we must take up the cudgels with those representatives who consider that the statements by the socialist delegations merely pick out and emphasize the differences between the positions of the socialist and the Western delegations. But for two months now the delegations of the socialist States have been repeatedly stressing that, with respect to the three Soviet proposals I have just been discussing, there is much common ground between the socialist and the Western countries. The United States delegation has said, for instance, that it would welcome a reduction of military budgets, and the United States Government is preparing to reduce its own military budget; that Government, like the others of the West, agrees in principle to the establishment of denuclearized zones. The Governments of the United States and the United Kingdom have promised, as I said a few minutes ago, to work for the conclusion of a non-aggression pact between NATO and the Warsaw Treaty countries.

We have emphasized before and would do so again that the views of nearly all delegations here coincide on this particular subject. Not the slightest progress has, however, been made. Does anyone really think that we shall make progress if we go on discussing how far we have reached agreement or how close our views are, but say nothing about the causes of the present deadlock in our work? Unknown obstacles cannot be overcome, so we must uncover them and remove them from our path. The sole object of stressing our disagreements here is to enable us to move forward.

We should be very grateful if the Western delegations would tell us how, in their view, we could remove as quickly as possible all obstacles to agreement on such important collateral measures as the reduction of the military budgets of States, the establishment of denuclearized zones, and the conclusion of a non-aggression pact between the NATO and the Warsaw Treaty States.

Sir Paul MASON (United Kingdom): I shall take the time of the Committee for only a few moments this morning. I wish to begin with references to two statements made at our meeting last Thursday, the last occasion when we discussed the question of collateral measures.

(Sir Paul Mason, United Kingdom)

The first of the statements to which I wish to refer was that made by the Swedish representative, speaking on the reduction of military budgets. Mr. Lind gave me the impression that he felt strongly that, before one could come to any conclusions on so large and complicated a subject, it would be necessary to discover exactly what we all meant when talking about the various problems. For example, our Swedish colleague used a phrase which I shall quote. He said:

"What we need is some exploration of the methods and material at hand for studying budgetary implications of disarmament."

(ENDC/PV.174, p.9)

That is something which we in the United Kingdom have always felt to be necessary: that we should know what it is that we are all talking about before we can reach any conclusions about whether or not progress is possible along this general line.

Mr. Lind went on to suggest that it might be desirable to have these questions discussed more informally by some kind of working party. Here again, as the Committee knows, his thought is very close to that of the United Kingdom delegation. Our Swedish colleague went even further when he told us that his delegation had in fact begun to prepare a working paper dealing with some of the basic propositions about which we should need to be clear when discussing this subject.

Speaking for the United Kingdom delegation, I personally welcome the fact that the Swedish delegation is prepared to make a move of that kind. I very much hope that the Swedish delegation will produce such a paper whenever it can find the possibility of completing it. I do not believe that this Committee is overloaded with material or work. I sometimes think that, on the contrary, it is rather starved of concrete proposals and suggestions for careful study. Therefore I repeat that I very much hope we shall see the Swedish working paper before very long.

At our last meeting on collateral measures, on 12 March 1964, the Committee had the advantage of an extremely thoughtful and careful survey from the representative of India (ibid., pp. 10 et seq.). I would recall what Mr. Trivedi said on that occasion when discussing the problem of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, and in particular how he spoke of the importance of developing the peaceful uses of atomic energy and of establishing and strengthening a system of international safeguards based on objective criteria in connexion with the supply of enriched uranium and plutonium (ibid., pp. 18-20).

(Sir Paul Mason, United Kingdom)

In dealing with that subject our Indian colleague was of course following closely what had been said at our meeting on 5 March 1964 by our United States colleague, who had told us of the steps which his Government had in mind on this subject and in particular of its decision to place one of its largest reactors under International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards (ENDC/PV.172, pp. 14 et seq.).

It does seem to me this is a subject which is so clearly beneficial to all concerned, not only from the point of view of security, though that is very important, but also from the point of view of the welfare of all nations, that it should not be difficult, given good will, to agree upon it, and not only to agree upon it but also to carry out effectively the agreements which might be reached. I cannot help feeling that it is something on which, so to say, it might be possible to find agreement almost around the corner. Therefore I hope very much that we shall all consider these questions which the Indian and United States representatives have discussed -- others of course have mentioned them, but those representatives in particular have dealt with them very carefully and thoroughly -- and we may find, as I hope, that real progress can be made in dealing with them.

Turning now to today's meeting, I want to say how much the United Kingdom delegation has been heartened and, indeed, gratified by the statement which the United States representative has made on the physical destruction of certain types of bombers. That is a subject which, as the Committee knows, has always lain very close to the heart of the United Kingdom Government. I am sure we all recall what was said on that subject by my own leader, the United Kingdom Foreign Secretary, on 25 February 1964 (ENDC/PV.169, pp. 12, 13). We believe that the actual physical destruction of some weapons -- and the destruction of bombers may very well be the right way to start -- is of paramount importance in showing that we are not only talking in generalities but also acting in concrete terms. It is, of course, a fact that the Soviet delegation, in putting forward proposals for the destruction of bombers (ENDC/123), goes very much wider. I need not stress the points of difference here, for they have been referred to by Mr. Fisher this morning and were, indeed, referred to by Mr. Butler at the meeting I have just mentioned.

(Sir Paul Mason, United Kingdom)

All the same, both sets of proposals deal with actual physical reduction, and it is perhaps not too much to hope that there is some possibility of finding some common ground somewhere here. At any rate I can myself easily recall circumstances in which two sides have started from points farther apart from each other and have come without undue difficulty to some understanding. I think our United States colleague this morning exposed very convincingly the reasons why it is important to start with something which is relatively small and entirely clearly defined. Although I call this measure "relatively small", I am sure we must all have been impressed by the actual possibilities of destruction contained in the weapons which he proposes should now be eliminated.

I have said many times in this Conference, and I shall say it many times again, that it is wrong to refuse to take up a proposal simply because it seems to be small or relatively small, limited or relatively limited to refuse to try to seize on the moment and to build on the initiative. If one looks at what has taken place in this Conference and if one looks at the nature of the agreements which have been achieved under this Committee's auspices, one can see that that is the way in which progress can best be made. So I hope we shall not be unduly impressed by statements to the effect that we are starting in a small way.

Lastly, I should like to say that I listened with great interest to the contribution made to our work this morning by the representative of Nigeria. Mr. Obi gave us a very thorough and thoughtful analysis of the various proposals before us. I find myself in agreement straight away with a great deal of what he said. I think we should all feel that a good deal of careful study might be devoted to everything that he said. What I should in particular like to say is that I agree wholeheartedly with our colleague when he says that we now have plenty of work before us and that in those circumstances there is no need to be unduly depressed at this stage because, so to say, that work is not being canalized or put on a formal agenda paper.

I hope that the discussion will proceed in such a way that before very long we can find exactly where the possibilities of progress lie. But in the meantime the possibilities are there before us, and I feel sure we ought to try to take advantage of them as soon as possible.

Mr. TSARAPKIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): The Soviet delegation has a few comments to make on today's statement by Mr. Fisher, the representative of the United States. I should like to remind the Committee that on 28 January the Soviet Government submitted for the consideration of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament (ENDC/PV.160, pp. 5 et seq.) a memorandum on measures for slowing down the armaments race and relaxing international tension. Among these measures is a proposal for the elimination of bomber aircraft. The memorandum states that ---

"The elimination of this type of armament would diminish the risk of war and help to strengthen the security of all peoples." (ENDC/123, p.5)

If this proposal were adopted, many thousands of bomber aircraft would be destroyed. Thus bomber aircraft which, though obsolete, still remain one of the powerful means of carrying on a war of aggression, used to deliver nuclear weapons many thousands of kilometres from their bases in order to inflict massive blows in the territories of other States, would be completely eliminated. There can be no doubt that this measure would genuinely serve the purpose of lessening the threat of war here and now, without the need to await agreement on general and complete disarmament.

What does the United States delegation propose as an alternative to this Soviet proposal? Mr. Fisher, the representative of the United States, today again brought up the question of the gradual destruction, spaced out over several years, of the obsolete United States B-47 bomber aircraft, which, as we know, are scheduled to be withdrawn from service in the United States Air Force. Yet it is known that, to replace this obsolete type of bomber aircraft, the armed forces of the United States are being reinforced by new and improved jet aircraft of the A-11 and other types, the development of which has either been completed or is being undertaken by various United States aircraft corporations under contracts placed by the Defense Department of the United States.

As you see, the implementation of the United States proposal for the destruction of the obsolete B-47 bomber aircraft will not only fail to prevent a further increase in armaments but will, on the contrary, serve to intensify the arms race in the development of new, improved types of multi-purpose military jet aircraft. Acceptance by the Committee of the United States proposal for the gradual elimination of B-47 bomber aircraft would be an unwarranted endorsement of this United States proposal, which is not a disarmament measure. This proposal is in fact a

(Mr. Tsarapkin, USSR)

manifestation of rearmament, which means increasing the efficacy of armaments and intensifying the arms race.

The objections the United States representative raised to the Soviet proposal for the elimination of bomber aircraft are unimportant and unconvincing, and cannot be taken into consideration. In this connexion I should like to draw attention to the statement made today by Mr. Obi, the representative of Nigeria, and those of other representatives in the Committee who support the Soviet proposal for the elimination of all bomber aircraft, and not merely of the obsolete B-47 class of bomber aircraft, as proposed by the United States representative. We hope that the United States and its Western allies will give serious thought to this problem and will concur in the Soviet proposal for the elimination of all bomber aircraft.

I shall now turn to another important matter. The Soviet delegation would like to revert to the question of the withdrawal of foreign troops from the territories of other countries. Mr. Gromyko, our Minister for Foreign Affairs, recently made the following statement in reply to a question by the correspondent of the newspaper "Izvestiya":

"One of the principal problems calling for solution is that of withdrawal of foreign troops from the territory of other States, or at least, as an urgent measure, reducing their numbers." (ENDC/127*, p.7)

I should like to remind you that this question was placed first in the list of measures proposed in the memorandum which the Soviet Government submitted on 28 January 1964 for discussion and decision by the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament. The memorandum contains the following passage:

"The presence of foreign troops in the territories of other countries is one of the principal sources of international tension and gives rise to conflicts fraught with danger to the cause of the peace and the security of the peoples. As recent events in various parts of the world have shown, the withdrawal of foreign troops from the territories of other countries is becoming increasingly imperative and urgent. Of particularly important significance would be the withdrawal of foreign troops from the territories of European States, where the troops and armaments of the NATO countries, on the one hand, and of the Warsaw Treaty countries, on the other, are concentrated in large numbers." (ENDC/123, p.1)

(Mr. Tsarapkin, USSR)

The events which have occurred in the past seven or eight weeks in the heart of this region provide a cogent and sharp reminder of the urgency of this problem, which calls for immediate solution. I do not propose at this stage to dwell on past history which abounds with examples of the violation of the air frontiers of the German Democratic Republic, or to refer to other provocative acts by NATO in this region. Let us now consider the events of the present year. We all know that within a short period of time, the air space of the German Democratic Republic was twice penetrated, on the orders of the United States military authorities, by military aircraft of the United States Air Force stationed in Western Germany or in the territory of its other allies. As everyone must remember, the first incident took place on 28 January and a further incident on 10 March. The Western Press makes no attempt to conceal that the purpose of these intrusions into the air space of the German Democratic Republic by United States military aircraft is to collect extensive and highly important information on the defence system and resources in this area. All these intrusions into the air space of the German Democratic Republic by United States military aircraft constitute flagrant violations of the State sovereignty of the German Democratic Republic, open provocation, and acts of military intelligence and espionage.

The Soviet Government's protest note of 11 March on the subject of the invasion of the air space of the German Democratic Republic by a United States military jet aircraft contains the following passage:

"The Soviet Government is compelled to give warning that, in view of the provocative behaviour of the United States military authorities and the continued regular flights along the frontiers of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries by aircraft of the United States Air Force carrying nuclear cargoes, and in view of the repeated violations by United States aircraft of the frontiers of socialist countries which are allies of the USSR, the order issued to the Soviet armed forces to prevent any violation of Soviet frontiers or the frontiers of our allies by foreign military aircraft has been confirmed."

As you see, the situation is of some gravity and requires careful consideration. These facts convincingly bear out the conclusion that the presence of foreign troops in the territories of other countries is one of the principal sources of international

(Mr. Tsarapkin, USSR)

tension, and gives rise to conflicts fraught with danger to the cause of the peace and the security of the peoples. We cannot remain passive in the face of these facts, which heighten the threat of military conflict. There is a way out of this situation. We must agree on the withdrawal of foreign troops from the territories of other countries, and we must agree on this without delay. Everyone understands that, if no foreign troops were stationed in the territories of the European countries and, in particular, in the territories of the two German States, incidents of this kind, which may at any moment precipitate a military conflict, would not take place but would be prevented.

In its memorandum of 28 January the Soviet Government proposed the most radical way of solving this question: that all foreign troops should be withdrawn from all foreign territories and that not a single foreign soldier should be left anywhere, in any part of the world. The Soviet Union expressed its willingness to withdraw all its troops from the territory of foreign States where they are now stationed if the Western Powers will do likewise.

I should like to draw the attention of all members of the Eighteen-Nation Committee to the declaration of the Soviet Government that, if the Western Powers are not as yet prepared for such a radical solution of the problem of the withdrawal of foreign troops, the Soviet Government proposes that agreement be reached immediately that the number of armed forces in foreign territories should first be reduced on a basis of reciprocity. Afterwards it would be possible to lead up gradually, step by step, to their complete withdrawal to within the boundaries of their national territories. As we know, the Soviet Union expressed its willingness to set about such a reduction of its troops in the territory of the German Democratic Republic and other European States, if the Western Powers would begin to reduce the number of their troops in the Federal Republic of Germany and other countries.

We would once again draw the attention of members of the Committee to the fact that agreement on the withdrawal of foreign troops from the territories of other countries would not be prejudicial to either side, since it would not disturb the general balance of forces between the States members of the two alliances -- NATO and the Warsaw Treaty. The implementation of these measures would undoubtedly lead to the normalization of the situation in Europe and would thereby contribute to the strengthening of universal peace. The Soviet delegation appeals to all delegations

(Mr. Tsarapkin, USSR)

in the Eighteen-Nation Committee to consider without delay the Soviet proposal for the withdrawal of foreign troops from the territories of other countries.

Mr. FISHER (United States of America) : I should like to make a very short intervention. The United States Government has expressed its regret that the United States aircraft to which the representative of the Soviet Union has referred crossed the demarcation line between the Federal Republic of Germany and the Soviet Zone of Germany. At the same time, the United States Government protested the precipitate action by the Soviet military forces in shooting down that aircraft. I do not think it is appropriate in this forum for me to engage in a debate, although it may be called for by the characterization which the representative of the Soviet Union gave concerning the reasons why the aircraft was there, except to say that it is not so. I can only express my regret -- and this is said with the greatest personal respect -- that the representative of the Soviet Union has injected into this Conference a matter which I believe does not help us to make progress towards the objective that we all want to achieve.

Mr. CAVALLETTI (Italy) (translation from French): I could certainly make a number of remarks about today's meeting. We have heard several statements of considerable length and great interest on collateral measures. Today, however, I should like to confine myself to a single remark.

I followed with the greatest attention the statement that Mr. Tsarapkin has just made. The representative of the Soviet Union stressed certain differences which, in his opinion, exist between the United States proposal put forward this morning by the United States representative, Mr. Fisher, and the Soviet proposal submitted to this Conference on 28 January last. (ENDC/123) I think that all delegations, and mine in particular, will study with great care the remarks made by Mr. Tsarapkin and that they will examine the differences which certainly exist and which are brought out by a comparison between the United States proposal and the Soviet proposal.

But among these differences there is one which Mr. Tsarapkin did not mention this morning but to which I personally attach great importance and which I should like to bring to the Committee's attention. This difference resides in the fact that the United States proposal for the destruction of certain types of bomber aircraft

(Mr. Cavalletti, Italy)

is accompanied and supplemented by a proposal to freeze strategic nuclear vehicles. On the other hand, if I have understood it correctly, the Soviet proposal, which is certainly more comprehensive and which provides for the elimination of all the bomber aircraft of all countries, is not accompanied by a similar freeze proposal. In those circumstances we may well ask what would be the use of the destruction, even the total and general destruction, of all bomber aircraft if a halt in the production of strategic nuclear weapon vehicles were not previously or simultaneously agreed upon and effected. The advantages of destroying all bomber aircraft would undoubtedly be illusory. Such destruction would have no particular advantage if the production of more modern bombers and more dangerous missiles were pursued and developed. The gap left by the bombers that had been destroyed would soon be filled, and probably more than filled, by new, more effective and probably more dangerous instruments of war.

On the other hand, if we begin by freezing all strategic devices capable of carrying nuclear bombs to their target, any measure, even limited, for the destruction of bomber aircraft would immediately assume considerable importance and a wide scope, for in that case we should be sure that the missiles that had been destroyed would not be replaced by others which would cancel out the earlier destruction. In my opinion, therefore, it is in the context of the proposal to freeze all strategic nuclear weapons, both missiles and bombers, that today's United States proposal assumes such significance and importance.

Hitherto the Soviet delegation's response to our freeze proposals has been on the whole negative. Nevertheless, I remember that in the past it also responded negatively to our proposal for the partial prohibition of nuclear tests. And yet the Soviet delegation came to understand the usefulness and value of the partial prohibition of tests, and this led to the conclusion of the Moscow Treaty (ENDC/100/Rev.1). May I therefore be allowed to recall this precedent, as an encouragement to hope that the exchange of views now taking place will develop favourably and that we shall be able to attain the goal we have set ourselves?

The Conference decided to issue the following communiqué:

"The Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament today held its 176th plenary meeting in the Palais des Nations, Geneva, under the Chairmanship of H.E. Ambassador Abate Agedé, representative of Ethiopia.

"Statements were made by the representatives of the United States, Poland, Nigeria, Bulgaria, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union and Italy.

"The next meeting of the Conference will be held on Tuesday, 24 March 1964, at 10.30 a.m."

The meeting rose at 12.30 p.m.